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I.

Introduction
The purpose of rnonet3.ry policy is to ensure that money doesn't matter.

There are three reasons why money may matter for real economic performan:::e.
First, to the extent that monetary growth is causally connected with infla
tion, insufficient or excessive money growth (even if fully predictable)
will cause the actual inflat::.on rate to differ from the optimal one.

'!'he

optimal inflation :-ate is the one that produces satiation with costlessly
produced ncn-interes t-oear ing r.:Lmey balances.
zero nominal interest rate.

If the real· interest rate is positive, the

optimal inflation rate will be neg:;tive.
pra tically unintere,; ting.

matter.

It is associateJ ,;;;. th a

This result is both well-knm,•n and

Equally cbvious is the second reason uhy ,i:o:1ey may

Monetary policy should not introduce extraneous, unnecessary noise

into the economic system.

Even in an idealized flexible price econvilly, ran

domization of monetc1ry policy will be costly if the realization of the sto
chastic money supply process are not immediately and fully observable by riri\•att\

agents.

Adopting non-stochastic policy rules is of course quite consistent

with the specification of the monetary policy rule as a known, contingent

(conditional or flcxibh:) function of current or past observables.
The third reason why money may matter hinges on the presence of
nominal inertia or stickiness in the behaviour of wages andior prices.

Given such "Keynesian" features, tight rnonet~ry policy will not result in

a transitjon to a lower price level or inflation rate at full employment.
Even if in the long run, reductions in money growth arc associated wit~
equal reductions in the rate of inflation, the real-time transition or
traverse may involve persistent and significant periods of excess capacity
and involuntary

uncmploy □ ent.

\'/ell-designed monetary policy mini mi :.es
1
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these output or unemployment costs of achieving a sustained and sustainable
reduction in the rate of inflation.

To minimize the "sacrifice ratio , 111

it will often be beneficial to use the instruments of fiscal policy in
conjunction with monetary policy.

The two are of course linked.through

the government's budget identity, but there are infinitely many combina
tions of changes in taxes, spending, borrow~ng and external financing that
are consistent with a given sustained change in the rate of monetary growth.
Alternative complementary fiscal packages may have greatly different impli
cations both for the adjustnent process and for the nature of the ultimate
equilibrium.
In an open economy, external policies and events will alter the·cur
rent and anticipated future constraints faced by the domes.tic policy maker.
Thus, under a credible fixed exchange rate regime, the domestic rate of
inflation cannot be_ systematically higher or lower than the world rate of
inflation.

Foreign monetary and fiscal policy actions affect the domestic

economy through goods markets (e.g., by altering world demand for hol'le
country traded output), through interest rate linkages and, in the case of
an endogenous exchange rate regime, through spot and forward exchange mar-

kets.

Freely floating exchange rates do not, except in; very special and

practically unimportant cases, insulate a country from external real and
financial shocks, nor do they prevent the spillover of domestic disturbances
into the rest of the world.

Only the most naive zero-capital mobility, trade

balance view of exchange rate determination could lead one to believe that
"decoupling" through exchange rate flexibility is an option.
1The sacrifice
ratio is the cumulative undiscounted net output or unemploy
ment cost of achieving a one rercent steady-state reduction in the inflation
rate.
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The existence of mutual spillovers is not by itself sufficient for
policy coordination.

It could be the case that policy actions are properly

'~riced'' so that even decentralized, non-cooperative policy design leads
to Pareto-efficien t outcomes.
sufficient to refute it.

Merely to state this possibility is almost

The two main reasons are that market prices are

not sufficient indices of marginal social value and that national policy
makers are not sub-atomistic, competitive ~gents.

Even in highly abstract,

idealized representations of competitive, market-clearing economies such
as the overlapping generations model, the incompleteness of the set of
markets (reflecting, e:g., the difficulties one is likely to encounter
when attempting to make binding private contracts with the dead and the
unborn) may prevent prices in the markets that do exist from being accurate
social shadow prices.

Other.reasons for the non-existence of a complete

set of Arrow-Debreu markets are adverse selection and moral hazard.

The

insufficiency of market prices for harmonizing non-cooperative policy actions
is especially serious when labor, goods or credit markets are in disequi
librium (or in non-Walrasian equilibrium) and non-price rationing occurs.
In addition, the non-atomistic nature of national policy makers means that
they do not necessarily treat market prices or other policy makers' actions
as parametric when designing policies that are optimal from a national per
spective.

Government behavior in countries other than Andorra, Lichtenstein,

Luxembourg, etc., is more properly viewed as a non-cooperative dynamic game
against other governments and against markets with anticipating (even if
competitive) private agents.
large

In these markets some governments will be

participants.
·To assert that, given externalities and non-competitive behavior

by governments, there exists scope for global welfare improving policy
coordination schemes that move the world economy closer to the contract
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erative " sr.hem~s
curve, is not to arg•.1e that there may not also be many "coop
global welfar e.
that will result (or in the past have result ed) in reduce d
welfar e imNor does the merely qualit ative propo sition that there exist
nation deny
provin g arrang ement s for intern ationa l coope ration and coordi
ement could
the possib ility that the quant itative signif icance of the improv
the fruits of
be _slight and/or highly uncer tain. The task of quanti fyinb
beyond the
intern ationa l policy coord inatio n is an import ant one but lies
scope of this paper.

In what follow s I propos e to study th1; desig~ of

ic system .
effici ent disinf lation ary polici es in an interd epe~d ent econom
~naly tic~l twc
The formal vehicl e for.th is analys is is a small anc sinpie
2
I will start with the
countr y macroe conom ic ration al expec tation s model.
ility of
case of the flex-p rice New Classi cal wonde rland in which credib
lation .
monet ary policy is. necess ary and suffic ient for costle ss disinf

The

be traced in
conseq uences of succes sive conces sions to realism can then
a relati vely straig htforw ard manne r.

The conseq uences of unilat eral ar.d

throug hout.
coordi nated policy design and im?ler nentat ion are empha sized
ion at
In what follow s, "first -best" polici es which elimin ate inflat
exist,
a stroke withou t output or unempl oyment costs will almost always
and can be derive d by iuspec tion.

It will theref c~e not be necess ary

ions frcm
formal ly to specif y an object ive functi onal penali zing deviat
zero inflat ion and from f~ll employ ment or capac ity outpu t.

The paper

the first
does not deal at all with the "incen tive-c ompat ibility " of
onsist ent.
best polici es, i.e., with whethe r these polici es are time-c

2rhe analys is relies heavil y on the single -coun try analys is of effici ent
~~try
two-co
disinf lation ary policy in Buiter and Miller [19t3b ]. The
.
[1982]
Miller
in
used
model
the
of
ion
model is a slight extens

5

II.

ry and
A Model in Which Credib ility of Moneta ry Policy ls Necessa
Suffici ent for a Costles s Sustain ed Reduct ion in Inflati on
The various models to be conside red in this paper will differ from

s.
each other only as regards the specifi cation of the inflati on proces
They will have a common set of portfo lio balance equatio ns and output
market equilib rium equatio ns.

These are given in equatio ns (1)-(7) .

Starred

home
variab les relate to the foreign country , unstarr ed variab les to the
country .

All variab les except for interes t rates, measur es of fiscal stance

and tax rates are in lqgarit hms.

The notatio n is as follows .

mis the

r the
nomina l stock of money, p the consum er price index, y real output ,
as the
short nomina l interes t rate, e the nominal _ exchang e rate, measure d
an
number of units of home currenc y per unit of foreign currenc y, f is
. the
index of fiscal stance, v the value added deflate r at factor cost,, 1.
comindirec t tax rate, i a measure of real money balanc es, c interna tional
tional
petitiv eness or the real exchang e rate andµ the instant aneous propor
rate of growth of the nomina l money stock.
All parame ters are non-ne gative.
time deriva tive of x.

x denotes

the right-h and side

Expec-t ations are formed rationa lly. Et denotes the

conditi onal rationa l expect ation operato r at time t.

(la)

rn - p - ky - ).r

(lb)

rn * - p * : k* Y*

(2a)

y = -Y(r - E

t

p)

(2b)

(3)

r - r

*

r*
h
- ,*
+ cc + E(ro-p) + 8f + Tly*

6

= av+

(4a)

p

(4b)

p*

(Sa)

t

(Sb)

t*

(6)

C :

(7a)

µ

(7b)

µ*

(1-a) (e

+

v*) + •.1

= a*v"+ (1- a*) (v-e)

-

m -

-

e

••*
l

O <a*< 1

V

V*

m*

-

+

O<a < 1

+

v* - v

m

-

•1c

m•

Equations (la) and (lb) are standard domestic and foreign money
demand functions.

Demand for domestic output, in (2a) is a decreasing

function of the real interest rate and an increasing function of competi
tiveness, of real money balances, of the degree to which fiscal policy is
expansionary, as measured by
activity.

f,

and of the foreign level of economic

The demand for foreign output is specified analogously in (2b).

The money stock is to be interpreted as narrow money, say the mone
tary base.

Domestic money is held only by domestic residents, for domestic

transactions purposes.

There is no direct currency substitution.

Tnis

seems reasonable as domestic money is dominated as a store of value by
short domestic bonds and foreign money by short foreign bonds.

Between

these two interest-bearing assets there is perfect substitutability.

Equa

tion (3) represents uncovered interest parity, the outcome of perfect markets
and risk-neutral speculative behavior.

The consumer price index is a weighted

average of the two national value added deflators as shown in (4a) and (4b).

Indirect taxes can drive a wedge between factor costs and market prices.

3

4rhe absence of explicit consideration of the government budget id~ntitv is
justified as follows.
In natural units (using upper case lette~sJ the domestic
output m3rket equilibrium condition and public sector budget identity (under
a freely floating exchange' rate regime) can be written as follows:
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In the New Classic al wonder land of this section , output is 3lw.:iys
equal to its exogeno us capacit y or full employm ent level, i.e.,
(Sa)

y = y

(Sb)

Y* =

y* .

What permits this is the perfec t flexib ility of the domest ic and
money
foreign price levels and (in the backgro und) of domest ic and foreign
wages.

GDP deflato rs have the flexib ility normal ly associa ted with the

exchang e rate and other financ ial asset prices.

The domest ic and foreign

rates of inflati on can be express ed as in (9a,b)

)
P EP* M
Y =Fr
( - Et p, ~ , p, G, T, Y*

F

r

• •
~B

< 0 • F

'

C

= G + ~B

>

- T.

T total taxes
G denotes exhaus tive public spendin g on goods and service s,

net of transfe rs. Bis the nomina l stock of governm ent bonds.
effect of fiscal policy on demand in equatio n (2a) is given by

a.2.n y

ac

dG

+ a£.n y

ar

dT

Sf, the

Note that, if the balance d-budg et multip lier is

positiv e, then FG > !. FT'I .
I assume that as regards bond financi ng the domest ic author ities
through out follow a "consta nt financ ial crowdinr?, out ?ressur e" policy
B/P.
which consist s in keeping constan t the re~i. stock of governm ent debt
B(P/?)
=
B
·ri1us
nt.
The foreign author ities similar ly keep B*/P* consta
the
and B* = B*(P*/P *) . Whethe r or not B/P and B*/P* are argume nts in
cy
conscan
their
ns,
functio
money demand functio ns and/or the output demand

second
of
as
g
ignorin
am
I
.
makes it unnece ssary to conside r them further
and
abroad
held
be
order importa nce the fact that domest ic bonds may
c
foreign bonds domest irally. Let Bddeno te domest ic holding s of domesti
debt.
ent
governm
ic
governm ent debt and Bf foreign holding s of domest
~ is
Then B = Bd + Bf and, by analogy , B* = B*d J B*f • The proper argurn.:m
oral
behavi
foreign
for
EB*d
+
domest ic behavi oral relatio nships is ,_d - E._
p
p
u
B*
B
B*f
*f = Bf
Even if p and P* are constan t ever
- EP* + P*
the proper argume nt is b
*f could vary. If purchas ing power parity (p.p.p. ) held, th~n
d
time, b and b

•
p

(9a)

p.*

(9b)

.

= - .t

.

•
+ (1-a)c + lJ + T.

= -.t.*

1

-

o - a*) c +

.*

l.1 * + T.

1

.

Equivalently (except at those instants.at which "news" arrives),
we can look a.t the expected rates of inflation given in (9 'a) and (9 'b):

(9 'a)

•bd

+ b. *f

=

o •

.

·d

Without p.p.p., b

EP* • f
b* =

+p

(EE - pP+ P*P*) \/EB*d-Bfl
p
j·

Even if total (global) real bond wealth doesn't change, a redistribution
of a given total through current account deficits and surpluses (or
through capital gains and losses) may change total demand for a country's
output if the marginal propensity to spend out of bond wealth on that
country's output differs between the two countries. I rule out any such
"transfer effects" either on total spending or on spending on the indi
vidual countries' outputs.
Given our bond financing assumption, we can write

Given M/P , G and (r -

})J,

the authorities can use total taxes net of

transfers to choose the rate of monetary growth,µ •

This still leaves

them real spending, G, to set the current fiscal stimulus fat its desired

value. Note, however, that since total tax receipts T (and G) are "assigned"
toµ and Bf , the indirect tax rate 'i cannot be varied independently.
Higher values of 'i must be matched by a lower direct tax rate 'd .
simplicity I will represent this requirement as ' i + 'd

=, .

For

9

(9'b)

1,

1*

and

c

form a minimal set of state variables for our model.

The state equations can be written as:
JJ

u*

.
EtR.
(10)

T.

1

all al2 al3

E i* = a21 a22 a23
t

.
Etc

a31 a32 a33

R,
R,

*

bll bl2 bl3 bl4 blS bl6 bli bl8 bl9 bl,10
+

b21 b22 b23 b24 b25 b26 b2i b28 b29 b2,10

T *.
l

f

f*

C

T.

1

••

T.
l

where the aij and bij coefficients are given in Appendix l.
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The system given in (9) has three non-predetermined, forward-looking
or'jump'state variables.
v

and

rate
c

v*
e

=e

+

The domestic and foreign value added deflators,

are flexible, market-clearing prices, as is the nominal exchange
The boundary conditions for

v* - v

m-v ,

R. -

=m* - v*

.e,*

and

take therefore the form not of given initial conditions

but of the terminal or transversality condition that the solution to (10)
should lie on the stable manifold (if this exists).

For this terminal con

dition to generate a unique, convergent solution trajectory for
and

c,

i,

R.*

given the actual and anticirated future values of the ten forcing

variables, the characteristic equation of (10) should have three unstable

roots, i.e., roots with positive real parts.

It is easily seen -that if

there are no real balance effects in the two countries' IS curves

(e: = e:*-= 0)

/

the three characteristic roots are
P3 = [y -1O +y *-1 o * ]/ [ a

+a* -1 ] •

P

1

= >.

-1

,

P

.

2 = >.

*-1

and

The first two are always positive, the

third will be positive if a+ a*> 1,

i.e., if on average the residents

of each of the two countries have a preference, at the margin, for spending
on own output.

If both

be satisfied. 4

a

and

a*

exceed one half, this condition will

The characteristic roots are continuous functions of the

in equation (10). A sufficient condition for (10) to have 3 unstable
lJ
characteristic roots is therefore a+ a*> 1 and small real balance effects.

a..

The steady state conditions of the model have the familiar long-run
classical or monetarist properties.

The same set of steady-state conditions,

given in (11) below, will also characterize the other variants of the model
analyzed in this paper, although the latter exhibit "Keynesian" behavior

outside the steady state.
4 1£ a

+

a* = 1 ,

p = p* + t- l

~~.
l

the exchange rate is constant,

e - 0

and
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. .=

(lla)

p =

(llb)

p*

(llc)

e

(lld)

r

= r*

(lle)

y

=y

(llf)

y*

(llg)

r

(llh)

V

).J

.

•

= v* = J,J*

. =µ -

µ*
+

1.1 -

J.J *

= y*
=

(o*y+oy*) u+oc*>. * (J.J-J.J*) +o*Bf+oB*f*- [o* (I-Ek) .;.on*]y- [o (1-E*k*)-o*n ]y*
(y+EA)o*+(y*+c*>.*)o

c = (y*+E*A*)EAlJ - (y+EA)E*A*u* - (y*+E*A*)Bf + (Y+EA)8*f*
(y+EA) o* + (y*+E*A*) o

+ [(y*+E*>.*) (1-Ek)+(y+E>.)n*]y - [(y+E).) (1-E*k*)+(y*+E*A*)n]y*
(y+E~.) o*

(lli)

i = ky - >.r + (1-a)c + •.

(llj)

t* =

➔

(y*+E*A *) o

1

k*y* - A*(r - ii+ ii*) - (1 - a*)c +

T~
1

In the long run, real interest rates arc equalized and the real exchange
rate is constant.

Differences in monetary growth are reflected in the rate

of depreciation of the exchange rate.

The world real interest rate rises

with fiscal expansion at home and abroad.

An

increase in capacity output

at home or abroad lowers the long-run real interest rate if

o*(l - ck) - on* > O and

o (1 - E*k*) - o*n > O respectively.

If there is

no real balance effect at home or abroad, a change in the rate of growth
of the nominal mney stock at home (abroad) raises the domestic (foreign)
nominal interest rate one-for-one and leaves the long-run real interest
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rate unaffected.

If there is a real balance effect at home

(c

> 0)

an

increase in monetary growth at home raises the nominal interest rate at
home less than one-for-one .

The real interest rate (at home and abroad)

is reduced.
Absent real balance effects, changes in money growth rates leave
the long-run real exchange rate unaffected •. With a real balance effect
at home, higher money growth at home means a long-run depreciation of the
real exchange rate.

The mechanism is that, if

A> 0,

higher money growth

and domestic inflation lowers the real stock of money balances and thus
the demand for output.

An

improvement in competitive ness is required to

rebalance the output market.

Fiscal expansion at home causes long-run

real appreciatio n while fiscal expansion abroad has the opposite effect.
It should be clear that a proportiona l shift in the levels of the domestic
or foreign money stock paths will not affect the nominal or real interest
rate or the real exchange rate but will be associated with equal propor
tional shifts in the levels of the paths of

p ,

p* and e.

Linear dynamic rational expectation s models in continuous time can
in general be represented as in equation (12)

iCt)

(12)

[ Ety(t)

where
an

x

n - n
1

is an

l = A[x(t)l

+

bz(t)

y(t)

vector of predetermin ed state variables, y is

vector of non-predeter mined state variables, and

vector of exogenous or forcing variables.

izable and has

stable and

n - n1

We assume that

A

z (t)

is a

is diagonal-

unstable characteris tic roots.

boundary conditions for (12) are given by:

The

13

(13a)

( n

(13b)

1

initial condition s)

The solution should lie on the stable manifold

( n- n

1

terminal condition s).
Let

A

be a diagonal matrix whose diagonal elements are the charac-

teristic roots of

A • · We partition

A as follows:

A = [Al
0

is the
while

n1 x n
2

Let

\'

be an · n

rows are linearly independe nt left-eigen vectors of
A ,

B ,

v-l

= l~

D =v

21 1

V and

We also define

A
1

matrix whose diagonal elements are the stable roots of

1

contains the un.-;table roots.

A

O ] •
A
2

B

conformab ly with . x

+

v

and

A.
y

:<

n

matrix whose

We partition
as follows:

B •
22 2

The solution to the two-point boundary value problems (12), (13a)
and (13b) is given by:

(14a)

y(t)

A

14
In the classical model of equation (10) the x-vector of predetermined
variables vanishes, yT(t) = [t(t), t*(t), t(t)] , 6 and

zT(t)

= [µ,µ*,Ti'

Ti• f, f*,

y,

y*,

Ti' Ti] .

Thus:
lJ (s)

l-t*(s)
P

e

1 (t-T)

Ti (s)

0

Ti (s)

!(t)
(15)

i*(t)

-1
= -V22

f°'
Jt

P

e

0

2 (t-T)

0

c(t)·

p 3Ct-T)

0

e

DEt

f(s)

<ls

f*(s)
y(s)
y*(s)

-r i (s)

'ti (s)
The crucial aspect of equation (15) is that the state variables depend
only on current anticipations of future values of the forcing variables.

Current and past behavior of the exogenous variables and the policy instru
ments matters only to the extent that it influences

expectations of the

future.
From the general dynamic specification of the model in equations
(1)- (8) and from the steady state conditions in equation (11), or from

equations (9a), (9b) or (9'a), (9'b) and (10) the following result can
be obtained by inspection.

The initial sit~ation is one of constant values
•
"* = 0 ) ,
T. = T.

of all forcing variables (i.e.,
Proposition 1:

l

l

In the flexible price oodel, the credible announcement of

an immediate, permanent reduction in current and future monetary growth by
in the home country is necessary and sufficient for an immediate, sus

~l-1

tained reduction in domestic inflation by
6

yT

denotes the transpose of

y

6µ •

15

It will be obvious that in this model with its instantaneous marketclearing features there will never be any output costs of bringing down
inflation.

Lack of credibility about future monetary growth may, however,

prevent a desired reduction in inflation, no matter how faithfully the
authorities restrict the current monetary growth rate.

E.g., the possi

bility of the election at some future date qf an inflation-prone government may prevent even a very conservative government from translating
monetary deceleration during its term of office into corresponding reductions
in current inflation.

It is not sufficient to commit oneself, one must also

be able to commit one's successors.

The recognition of this dilemma is

behind some of tbe calls for embedding monetary policy in a constitutional
frame-w:ork (or tying it into a constitutional straightjacket, depending on one's
point of view) in order to safeguard it against political manipulation.
The response of the system to the immediate credible permanent reduction in domestic monetary growth is especially transparent when there are no
real balance effects (£ = c* = 0).

The transition to the new steady state

with the lower rate of inflation is instantaneous.

All real variables

other than the domestic rate of inflation and the domestic stock of real
iooney balances remain unchanged.

The domestic nominal interest rate de

clines by the same amount as the reduction in domestic monetary growth
and domestic inflation.

Foreign inflation remains unchanged.

of depreciation of the domestic currency
of the reduction in

lJ

and

.

p •

(e)

The rate

also declines by the a~ount

Real competitiveness remains constant.

Note however, that both the domestic value added deflater

v

and the

nominal exchange rate undergo an immediate discontinuous or discrete drop
at the time of the policy announcement with

AV= Ae = >-All •

The reason

for this is apparent in the domestic money <ler.iand function (la).

Lower

16

money growth and lower inflatio n imply a correspo ndingly lower nominal
rate of intzrest .

This raises the demand for real money balances .

With

the level of the nominal money stock given (only its instanta neous rate
of change has declined by a finite amount) and output exogeno us, the re
quired jump increase in m-p must be effected through a discrete decline
in

p.

With real competi tiveness constan t, the decline in

up of equal discrete reductio ns in
in Figure 1.

v

and

e.

p

is made

The picture is drawn

Note that there are no externa lities or indeed any real ex

ternal effects of the dqrnestic anti-inf lation program •. Coordin .!ticn is
redunda nt.
When ther-e are non-zero real balance effects , immedia te credible per
manent reductio ns in domestic money growth again result in an immedia te
transiti on to the new steady state equilibr ium with domestic inflatio n
reduced by the amount of the reductio n in money growth and with foreign
inflatio n unchange d.

This time, however , the real interest rate at home

and abroad and the real exchange rate will be affected .
ar _

Since

aii" -

o*y + o(y* + e:*11* )
o* (y+e:;\) + o (y* + e:*>. *)

(across steady states), the domes-

tic (and foreign) real interest rate rises when the domestic money growth

rate is cut if

£ >

0.

than one-for- one when
rate

r

+ µ* - µ

rises.

The domestic nominal interest rate declines less
µ

is lowered, while the fo:..-eign nominal interest
ac

(y* + e:*;\ *)£\

Since ajj" = (y+e:>.)o* + (y* + e:*>.*)o (across steady

states), a reductio n in domestic money growth worsens domestic competiv e

ness if

c

>

0.

The reason is that a lower value of

interest rate equally at home and abroad.

µ

raises the real

The domestic nominal interest

falls, however, while the foreign nominal interest rate rises.

The domestic

stock of real balances thus goes up while the foreign real money stock
declines .

To equilibr ate the domestic and foreign output r.iarkets domestic
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competitiven ess must decline (foreign competitive ness must improve).

In

this case the credible announcement of the immediate, permanent reduction
in µ

is accompanied by a discrete drop in

in v*.

While

c

v

falls, the impact effect on

and a discrete increase

e

is ambiguous.

There are several ways of avoiding these spillovers from domestic
monetary growth reductions on real variables that concern foreigners.
The home country could stop its real interest rate (and thus the world
real interest rate) from rising by contraction ary fiscal policy with
£A
Af = -=t6µ
. This would·also stabilize the real exchange rate and stop
the foreign nominal interest rate from rising.

The foreign country cannot

use fiscal policy alone to stabilize both its real interest rate and its
real exchange rate.

To prevent the real interest rate from rising, contractionary fiscal policy abroad is called for --(with Af* = £Ao*
Q*~tµ) while to
.

.

-

stop foreign competitive ness from improving, expansionar y fiscal policy abroad
+£*A*) £Ab.
is called for w1 th LIAf* = - (y*(y+£A)S
It is clear from equations
µ •
(Ilg) and (llh) that the foreign money growth rate
fiscal stance,

f*

µ*

and the foreign

can be used jointly to stabilize the real interest

rate and the real exchange rate.

This does mean, of course, that the foreign

country cannot choose to stabilize its real exchange rate and its real
interest rate while maintaining its previous rate of inflation.
It is possible for the two countries jointly to choose any pair
of inflation rates

p

and

p*

while maintaining the old real interest

rate and competitive ness by using both money growth rates and fiscal in
struments appropriate ly.
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III.

Models in Which Smart Demand Management Is ~~cess~rv and Sufficient
for a Coc::tless, Sustained Rc<luction in Inflation
The main reason for spending time with the classical model in which,

given credibility , nothing can go wrong, is that it provides good insight

into what can go wrong in more realistic and useful models.
It is generally accepted that the level of money wages and the GDP
'
deflater are not like the foreign
exchange rate or the stock market index.

A common alternative view is -chat the value added deflater (or the wage)
changes only gradually o·ver tir.ie in response to excess· denand or supr,ly
pressure, e.g., through an augmented Phillips curve:
(16)

(16 ')

d

dt CV
· * - e*,,.*)
•d -- ''•*Cy*-y*)
"'

+ n*,

0 < 6* < l.

In (_16) it is recognized that the direct tax rate may influence
the behavior of before-truc wages and other factor payments.

The two ex-

treme possibilitie s are that it is the rate of change of after-tax factor
rentals

( v - -rd

and v * - -rd

of before-tax factor rentals

e

with
( v

= S* = 1 )

and v*

with

determined through the Phillips curve mechanism.

or the rate of chang~
e = e* = 0)

that is

v - e-rd and v* - 8*-r*d

are treated as sluggish or predetermin ed (i.e., incapable of making a dis

continuous jump at a point in time).

The sacrifice ratio depends crucially

on the specificatio n of the process governing n,
in the Phillips curve or "core inflation."
non-augment ed Phillips curve,

v=

ljl(y-y)

implies an infinite sacrifice ratio.

the augmentatio n term

Note that the old-fashion ed
+

ir where ir is exogcnous(e .g., zero)

To keep inflation at a lower level

forever, the output or uncmrloymcnt gap

y-y

has to be increased ancl kept
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at this higher level forever.
There are at least three well-known models of the inflation process
which combine the view that
with the view that

v - e.d

(the prive level) moves sluggishly

(core inflation) moves flexibly.

1r

Two are repre

sented in (16) plus (17) or (18) below, the third in (19a), (19b), (19c):

.,

(17)

lT

=

(18)

'Ir

•
= p ;

(19a)

•
~
V =

lJ

,r* = 1J *

•

~

lT

* =~
p*

n(w-v) ;

~v*•

= n* (w* - v*)

(.19b}

E ~* = O* (w* -

t

v* - 1'1* (y* - y*))

(19c)

The first model (17) has core inflation equal to the current money growth
rate (Dornbusch [ 1980] , Bui ter and Miller [ 1981] •

.

.

inflation given by

p

or

p* ,

The second (18) has core

the right-side de.rivative of the price

level path of the classical, flex-price model of the previous section.
This means that core inflation equals the rate of change of the price level
in the classical equilibrium model except at those points where that rate
of change becomes infinite because the classical equilibrium price level makes

a discrete jump.

Price equations such as (16) and (18) have been used by

Mussa [1981] and Barro and Grossman [1976].

Equations (19a), (19b), and (19c) represent a contract model in

which the level of the current contract wage,
expectations of future values of

v and

w,

depends on current

excess demands and the

current value added dcflator depends on past contract wages.

This model

is due to Calvo [1982a, b, c] and can be viewed as a continuous time version
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of Taylor's model of overlapping, staggered 2-period nominal wage contracts
(Taylor [1980]).

The interpretation of (19a), (19b) and (19c) is clear

when we solve for

(20a)

=e

vet)

v

and

-n(t~to)

w explicitly ~s follows:

v(t )
0

+

n

ft

w(s)e-

n(t

)
-s ds

to

and
(20b)

= nJ:Et[v(s)

w(t)

+1/l(y(s) -y)]e-n(s-t)ds

+

entEt lim e -n-r w(-r)
't'-+co

or
(21a)

v(t) = v(t )
0

+

.
9[-rd(t) - -rd(tO)] + K(t - t 0 )

+

2
n 1j,J

t
t

and
(21b)

w(t) = v(t) - 9-ra(t)

+

ao

Js Es(y(z) -y)dzds

0

K + nlj,[Et(y(s) -y)ds
t

K in (20a) and (20b) is an arbitrary constant of integration, to
be determined by a tenninal boundary condition.

It is easily seen that

in models with a well-defined steady state rate of inflation and monetary
growth
while

µ

v

ao

,

the arbitrary constant

K is equal to

µ

ao

/n.

is predetermined in (20a), the current contract wage

Note that
w

is,

among other things, an increasing function of current expectations of future
excess demand and of the transversality condition determining steady-state
inflation through

K.

Since w is flexible, the rate of change of the

value added deflater,

-

of direct taxes on

if

cost flexibility.

v

•
v,

is flexible (see equation (19a)).
9

>

0

The effect

also introduces an element of domestic

All three models in equations (16)-(19) thus have flex

ible core inflation.

It may therefore appear that the credible announcement

of an immediate, permanent reduction in money growth would again be sufficient
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ments of future money gro;,;th and given a pol icy for mimickin g or avoiding
the need for, the price level drop shown in Figure 1.

We can write the domestic monetary equilibr ium conditio n as
(22)

=

Note that

ky -

v =v - e,d

AT+

(1-a)c + T.
l

is predeter mined.

To achieve an instanta neous transiti on to a new low-inf lation steacy
state, if the foreign country does not change any of its policy instrum ents,

the home country 's policy instrume nts should satisfy:

_ ). [o*y + oy* + oe:*A * + (a-1) (y* e:*). *) e:]
---------'--------'A. -----------~6µ
+

where

A. = (y+e:).) o* + (y* + e:*A *) o •
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(and necessary) for reducing domestic inflation without output costs.
This is not correct, because an immediate transition to a lower rate of
inflation would require, if the interest-el asticity of demand for money
balances is negative, that the stock of real money balances is increased.
In the classical flex-price model, the pric_e level drop shown in Figure 1
brought about the necessary increase in real money balances.

Absent price

level flexibi 1i ty, the authorities must either increase the level of the
nominal stock of r.1oney·balan ces, or cut direct or indirect taxes so as
to reduce the market price level for any given level of after-tax factor

income or preve·nt the fall in nominal interest rates associated with lower
steady state inflation by engagin~ in expansionar y fi3cal policy.
Proposition 2:

Therefore:

In the model with a predetermin ed price level but flexible

core inflation, credible, immediate, permanent reduction in money growth
in the home country is necessary for an immediate, costless, sustained
reduction in domestic inflatior. by the same amount.

In addition, the

authorities must either generate an immediate increase in the level of
the real money stock (by a 'jump' in the nominal money stock or by
direct or indirect tax cuts, with all fiscal variables adjusted in such
a way as to keep aggregate demand eq~al to full employment supply) or
engage in a set of fiscal measures (e.g., an increase inf) that prevent
a decline in the domestic nominal interest rate.

Only the first of

these two options avoids internation al spillover effects (assuming no
real balance effects).
In all three of these models one country's inflation can be
eliminated costlessly and at a stroke. given credibility of announce-
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If there is no real balance effect at home or abroad, the "money
jump" policy with

tim = ->..tiµ

would be the simplest way to proceed.

The

level of the nominal money stock is raised once-and-for-all at the same
time that its rate of growth is lowered.

While such a policy combination

may appear to be prone to credibility problems, it should be noted that
it would be implemented automatically if the government announced a cred
ible nominal income target rather than a monetary growth target.
income target is of course a "velocity-corrected"

A nominal

monetary target which

would automatically allow for the decline· in velocity associated with the
transition to a lower rate of inflation.

The jump in real money balances

can, from (23) also be achieved with an unchanged nominal money stock,
through a cut in indirect taxes balanced in terms of revenue by an increase
in direct taxes, provided

e

<

1 ,

i.e. provided indirect taxes have a

larger immediate effect on the price level than direct taxes. 7
Absent real balance effects, changes in

m or

't.
l

would permit

costless and instantaneous domestic disinflation without any real spill
overs to the foreign country.

The real interest rate, the real exchange

rate and the foreign country's nominal interest rate would be unaffected.

Expansionary dor.iestic fiscal policy (an increase in
time that

µ

f

at the

sa!iie

is reduced) will not in general be consistent with an immediate,

costless transition to a lower inflation st~ady state, except for a closed
economy or a small open economy.

Even without real balance effects, an

increase inf will be associated with a higher long-run real interest rate
and a long-run appreciation of the domestic real exchange rate.

The short

run result of such a policy combination would be to start a boom abroad,
stimulated by the improvement in foreign competitiveness.

The combination

of domestic money growth reductions and fiscal stimulus that would satisfy
7Remember that, with public spending constant, we must have 6Td + 6Ti = 0.
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the desired new low inflation do~cstic steady state conditions, would
in all likelihood create a transitio,1al slump at home.

With a real balance

effect even the rn0ney jump and indirect tax cut policies will have reper
cussions abroad.

The domestically correct steady state policy combination

is a1ain likely to cause a slump at home and a boom abroad.
If the domestic authorities adopt a money jump or indirect tax cut
policy 6 in conjunction with the money growth. deceleration when real balance
effects are present, the foreign authorities will in teneral need to change
two policy instruments to stay at full employment.

They could, e.g., accept

a higher real (and norninalJ inte1·est rat~ and an improved level of foreign
competitiveness br implementing a discontinuous, once-and-for-all reduc
tion in the level of the foreign nominal money stock (o:::- an increase in
foreign indirect taxes if

6* < 1)

and a change inf*.

The same

_result holds qualitatfvely whether or not real balance effects are
present, if the home countrr lowers money growth and raises fat
the same time.
A combined common reduction in money growth rates at home and abroad

will cause a global slump unless both countries undertake siP.:ultaneously
money jump policies, indirect tax cuts or fjscal stimuli.

If there are

no real balance effects, money jumps or indirect tax cuts in the two coun
tries permit an ir.unediate, costless global disinflation at a constant real
interest rate and real exchange rate.

Even if there are real balance

effects, an immediate costless global disinflation will be possible, with
mney jumps or indirect tax cuts in both countries, at a constant real ex

change rate but a higher real interest rate, if the two countries have

611 Indirect tax cut policy" refers to a constant revenue change from in
direct to direct taxes. There arc therefore no <lirc:ct ag£rcgatc JcmanJ
effects of such a policy.
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identical structures.

f

instruments

and

Without this restriction, however, the two fiscal

f*

will have to be used jointly with the reductions

in money growth and the money jumps or indirect tax cuts to achieve effi
cient global disinflation.
How important are the costs of badly-designed disinflation policy?
Consider as a simple illustrative exaJ11ple the wage-price block of equations
(4a), (16) and (17) where core inflation equals the rate of growth of the
money stock.

(_24}

A little manipulation yields

-J:(y(s) -y)ds = ¾{[m(=) -p(=) - (rn(t) -p(t))] +e[,:d(
+

[-ri (

00 )

-

Ti (0)] + (l~a) [c(oo) - c(0)

00

)

-

'd(t)]

J}

The cumulative net undiscounted output cost given in (24) increases
with the amount by which real money balances must be increased in the long
run.
equals

Without a nominal money stock jump, the long-run change in
-Alr where

i

means long-run or steady state change.

simplest case, without real balance effects,

rn-p
In the

The sacrifice

ratio is therefore

( (y(s) - y)ds
(25)

SR

c

-------

A
=

iii

A unilateral reduction in

~

has a sacrifice ratio of

A/~,

in

creasing in the interest sensitivity of money demand and decreasing in
the slope of the Phillips curve.

As

is clear from (24) or (2S) money jumps

or tax cuts could reduce the sacrifice ratio to zero.

Note, hO\-Jever, that

a,

a real appreciation of the currency (~c < 0) also lowers the sacrifice r3ti0.

The problem is that while (1-a) ic enters the domestic cost calculation
1'i

.
a* - 1 00
~* - ~centers the foreign cost calculation.
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The anti-inflationary gains

of real exchange rate appreciation are strictly beggar-thy-neighbor.

In

addition, the short-run gains from exchange rate appreciation accruing to
a single country may well oversta·te the long-run gains.

Note that without

00

real balance effects ~c = 0 after a unilateral reduction inµ.

As is shown,

e.g., in Buiter and Miller [1983a], any initial anti-inflationary gains due

to exchange rate appreciation must be ''handed back" as the loss of competitive00

ness unwinds in the long run, since in their model be= 0.

Of course the

timing of the anti-inflationary successes will be different when the exchange
rate is permitted to appreciate sharply in the short run, and early reduc
tions in inflation may be worthwhile in themselves, even if the net output
cost of fighting inflation is not af~ected.

It should also be pointed out

that the model (like all models in this paper) is assumed to be structurally
invariant with respect to the class of policy changes under consideration.
It may be that the "short sharp shock" of a sudden exchange rate appreciation
permits one to "over-write" the existing inflation equations.

The slug

gishness or inertia of the price-wage mechanism could vanish when the

government invests in credibility by engineering a brutal appreciation of
the exchange rate.

I do not consider that possibility in this paper.

In

any case, the foreign government would be disinvesting in credibility by
suffering a brutal depreciation of the exchange rate.
The moral of this section is that if there is only price level
inertia but no inflation inertia, well-designed aggre_ga te demand manage
ment ·policy (changes inµ, m, f, µ*, m* and f*) are sufficient to ensure
efficient, i.e., costless and instantaneous unilateral or joint reductions
in inflation. 8

When a greater degree of inertia is attributed to the wage

price process, this fairly optimistic conclusion vanishes.
8of course, indirect tax cuts may be helpful, if O <
0 < 1, even if f is
kept constant.
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IV.

Models in Which Genius or Good Luck Arc Necessary for

:i

Ccstlcss,

Sustained Reduction in Inflation
Many economists have a view of the wage-price process that implies
considerably more sluggishness and inertia than has been permitted in any
of the models considered thus far.

Multi-period contract models such as

Taylor's [1980] are·one well-known example.

Some of the essential features of this entire class of models are
represented by the simplest possible "adaptive" core inflation process.
It is characterized by a sluggish price level and, subject to somf' q Ja1i
1

For the home country equa

fications, a sluggish rate of core inflation.

For the foreign country

tions (4a) and (16) are combined with (25).

equations (4b) and (16') are joined with (25'):
(.25)

(25'1

It is easily checked that for the home country the sacrifice ratio is

now given by:

[ (y(s) - y) ds
(26a) . SR(t) -

C0

ll1T

=

1
t
-------=-f;ljl

- 1 -[eX-rd
,1,'r,.
..,o,..

+

i,.]

+

~:_!J~c
I~
ljlulJ

l

Note that a money level jump no .longer helps to avoid or even reduce
a

the output costs of bringing down inflation.~

rates or in the real exchange rate, both

v

Barring changes in tax

and

1r

are predetermined and

the sacrifice ratio depends only on the slope of the short-run Phillips
curve,

1",

and the speed of adjustment of core inflation,

, .

The foreign

sacrifice ratio is given by:
9

It may still be a useful (or even essential) component of a complete policy
package capable of achieving an instantaneous transition to 3 .lower rate of
inflation steady state.
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(26b)

SR*(t)

Following Okun [1978] we can, as was discussed in the previous sec
tion, use direct or indirect tax cuts to break core inflation.
8 = 1

Unless

and direct tax increases fully offset the price level effect of

equal revenue indirect tax cuts, an indirect tax cut financed by a direct
tax increase can melt core inflation.

Even if 8 = 1 a net cut in overall

taxes can have the desired effect on core inflation.

This exercise is

then of course complicated by the fact that tax cuts implemented for th~ir
cost-reducing effects will also have aggregate demand effects (i.e.,
would increase). Public spending will then have to be lowered
way as to maintain aggregate demand at full employment.
effect of changes in

c

f

in such a

Note the opposite

on the domestic and foreign sacrifice ratios.

If

the home country through its policy actions were to achieve a long-run
appreciation of its real exchange rate (a decline in

c )

then the foreign

country would, if its inflation objectives are constant, be forced to suffer
a cumulative net loss of output.

But for this output loss the depreciation

of the foreign country's real exchange rate would result in a rise in
foreign core inflation.
Note that if some form of incomes policy could shock core inflation,
i.e,, jump

u,

the output cost of bringing down inflation could be re

duced or even eliminated altogether without recourse to changes in the
tax structure (while keeping the aggregate denand effect of fiscal policy
constant) or to beggar-thy-neighbor, zero-sum attempts at "competitive
· loss of compet-i ti veness."
The rewards from a successful incomes policy would be enormous.
mechanism

The

for achieving it, theor~tically and in the light of historical
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, experience, is problematic.

With centralized wage bargaining and strong

unions capable of delivering on the shop floor wage agreements negotiated
centrally, it might be possible to achieve an anti-inflationa ry breakthrough
this way.

With decentralized, non-synchronize d and non-cooperative wage

bargaining someone has to go first while everyone ~ishes to go last.

Pro

posals for "real wage insurance" through the public purse, floated briefly
in the U.S.A. under Carter, may be helpful here.

Tax-based income policies

are, if anything, primarily a means for lowering the natural rate of unem
ployment (for raising

y).

They may, however, when they are introduced,

also serve to break the momentum of on-going core inflation.
Proposition 3:

If there is both a predetermined price level and quasi

predetermined, adaptive, core inflation, the policies required if both coun
tries are to achieve an instantaneous and costless disinflation are the
following.

Both countries have to announce and implement credible reductions

in the rate of growth of their nominal money stocks.

Tax cuts (or indirect

to direct tax changes) have to be implemented to break core inflation.

The

lower velocities associated with a successful transition to lower inflation
rates will have to be accommodated by a once-and-for-a ll increase in the
level of each country's nominal money stock.

Public spending in each

country is to be adjusted so as to maintain aggregate demand at its full
employment level.

Credible nominal income targeting could be a substitute

for the money growth deceleration and money level increase.
if effective, could be a substitute for tax cuts.

Incomes policy,
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infl atio n embo died in
It migh t be argu ed that the view of core
kwar d-loo king " and too opti mist ic.
equa tion s (25) and (25' ) is both too "bac
proc ess not only inco rpor ate
Modern ecle ctic view s of the wag e-pr ice
ge of wage s but also forw ard
slug gish ness in the leve l and rate of chan
stri ctly pred eterm ined , i.e.• ,
look ing beha vior . They also view 'IT as
e leve l brou ght abou t throu gh
unli ke (25) and (25' ) chan ges in the pric
s, cann ot move the leve l of 'IT
chan ges in the exch ange rate or tax rate
in equa tion s (26) , (27) and (26' ),
disc onti nuou s!Y· This view is repr esen ted

(27' ):·
• =
t1 (q-,r )

(26)

'IT

.*

(26' )

'IT

= ti (q* - 'IT*)

E/t = tzCq-p)

(27)

,

q

1 0
• ~*'
,i"

• ~2

• = t;(q * - p*)
Et q*

(27' )

~l > 0

0

>

~i

•

>

0.

n.
is the curr ent rate of wage cont ract infl atio

'IT,

core infl a-

rate ." It is a func tion of past
tion , has the inte rpre tatio n of "the goin g
n is a func tion of curr ent
cont ract infl atio n. Curr ent cont ract infl atio
demand and of what the "goi ng
expe ctati ons of the futu re stat e of exce ss
rate " will be in the futu re.
Solv ing for

(27)

. q(t)

(28)

n(t)

q

and

'IT

we find :

~2 .::_ ~l • When ~2 = ~l
and (28) _sim plify to:
prov ided the rele vant inte gral s exis t), (27)
This solu tion makes sens e only if

(and

l
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In this oodel the current contract rate of inflation,

q,

is non

predetermin ed but core inflation or "the going rate" is strictly predetermin ed.
Barring changes in tax rates and in the real exchange rate, current contract
inflation exceeds the g~ing rate if the "present value'~ of currently expected
future excess demand is positive.

Current core inflation equals core infla

tion at some initial date plus an increasin~ function of the sum between that

initial date and the current date of the present value of future excess de
mand expected at each instant between these two dates.

Domestic current

contract inflation can be reduced instantaneo usly by long-run tax cuts or
long-run real exchange rate appreciatio n.

Barring these two cham1els, only

credible announcements of (policies causing) future recessions can bring
down current contract inflation.

Credibility remains central, but is no

longer sufficient to avoid costs.

Core inflation cannot be brought down

instantaneo usly even when indirect or direct tax cuts or exchange rate ap
preciation are announced credibly.

It is a function of the entire history

of past expectation s of future excess demands, tax cuts and real exchange
rate appreciatio n.

Barring the last two influences, it is (past expec

tations of) credible future recessions that bring down core inflation.
Anticipated current and future reductions in nominal income growth or
monetary growth can no longer be translated painlessly into lower inflation.
They work if and to the extent that they create expectation s of future
recessions.

Note that this can create some awkward credibility and time

consistency problems.

Assume the authorities announce policies that will

cause a deep recession at some future date.

It is possible that inflation

33
and core inflati on are brough t down to their desired level before the
recessi on has actuall y started .

What governm ent, having licked inflati on

then
with the help of the announc ement effects of future recessi ons, would
create a recessi on merely to validat e these past expecta tions?

These

on
expect aticns would be bygones and a governm ent reoptim izing after inflati
had_ been brough t down would be tempted to cheat on its earlier policy
commit ments.

Such a policy announc ement would therefo re not be credib le.

Both global and single- country attemp ts to reduce inflati on will,
in the most realist ic of our models , always take time.

A single country

out
may achieve its anti-ir' i.flatio nary objecti ves withou t uneniploymer.t and
iation.
put costs by using cost-re ducing tax cuts and real exchang e rate apprec
income s
The world as a whole can rely only on tax cuts and, where feasib le,
policy.

The transit ion to the low inflati on equilib rium will involve the

interna l and externa l coordin ation of time-va rying traject ories for moneg.
tary growth (includ ing money stock jumps) , tax rates and public spendin
sen
If a serious researc h effort gets underwa y now, we may be ready with
accord
sible policy packag es when there is once again the perceiv ed need to
st.
high priorit y to reducin g inflati on, after the next inflati onary outbur

V.

Conclu sion
This paper has conside red anti-in flation ary policy design in an open

interde penden t econom ic system.

Policy instrum ent values or rules were

treated as though imposed "exoge nously. "

Both for positiv e analys is (how

is policy actuall y determi ned?) and for normat ive analys is (how should
endo
policy be designe d?) it is essent ial that policy behavio r should be
t the
genized through the explic it derivat ion of decisio n rules that reflec
cal,
objecti ves and the actual and perceiv ed constr aints (econom ic, techni
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administrative, political, and informational) of the policy makers.
Finally, it is impcrtant not to be misled by the deterministic nature
of the models considered in this paper, into believing that credibility and
precommitment require inflexible policy design.
preannounced rules are followed faithfully.

be contingent or conditional in nature.

Credibility requires that

These rules can, indeed should,

Provided the nature of the rules is

understood by private agents--and this requires simplicity and transparence
but not rigidity--and provided the government's record in sticking to its
commitments can be monitured promptly and at little cost, optimal or even
merely sensible policy design will always inccrporate scope for flexible
response to new information about the external environment and about actions
of other players.

The widely known result, that in models with rationally anticipating,
forward-looking private agents~ optimal policy design will not in general
be time-consistent , has led to a quite unwarranted resignation to the pursuit of time-consistent but suboptimal policies or even of time-inconsiste nt
and suboptimal policies, such as the adoption of constant money growth rules.
The moral is surely quite different.

Time-inconsiste ncy of optimal plans

calls for institutional innovation and reform aimed at making the ootireal
policy time-consistent .

New rewards, sanctions, threats or promises

should be designed to render optimal policy incentive-corr~ atible given the

new, purpose-built constraints.

Institutional, and indeed constitutional

innovation is bound to dominate resignation to the n th best.

.
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Appendix I
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The aij and bij coefficients of equation 10 are:
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b
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